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INTRODUCTION
In a February 2012 Dean's Lecture at Yale Law School titled National Securi-
ty Law, Lawyers, and Lawyering in the Obama Administration, Jeh Johnson,
then-General Counsel of the Department of Defense, undertook a strong de-
fense of the Obama Administration's legal regime and policies supporting the
U.S. military's counterterrorism efforts against al Qaeda and its associated
forces.' Scholars and lawyers of reasonable minds can-and ought to-
rationally debate many of the finer points of Johnson's legal analysis, including
the limitations he argues are placed upon the United States government's use of
force by certain precepts of international law. The goal in this short Essay, how-
ever, is not to consider the merits of Johnson's legal analysis. Instead, this Essay
highlights the various roles that national security lawyers in the executive
branch play and the variety of ethical responsibilities those roles entail. This
Essay critically discusses Johnson's broad assertion that the government-and a
fortiori, the government's lawyers-must guard against aggressive interpreta-
tions of its authorities, lest such interpretations discredit the government's ef-
forts, provoke controversy, and invite challenge.' This Essay argues that John-
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1. Jeh Charles Johnson, National Security Law, Lawyers, and Lawyering in the Obama
Administration, 31 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 141 (2013).
2. Id. at 145 ("Against an unconventional enemy that observes no borders and does
not play by the rules, we must guard against aggressive interpretations of our au-
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son's failure to contextualize this position-to specify whether it applies to all
situations that a government lawyer faces, or whether it is limited only to cer-
tain contexts-may lead a government lawyer to fail to meet his or her core eth-
ical responsibilities when serving as an advocate for the government in national
security matters.
Johnson's comments focus generally on defending the views of the Obama
Administration's national security lawyers. Johnson highlights the apparently
vigorous debate among the current Administration's lawyers and policymak-
ers,3 while also criticizing the prior Administration and some of its lawyers.4
What Johnson's speech does not do, however, is engage in any robust discus-
sion of the various roles and responsibilities-particularly the various ethical
responsibilities-of national security lawyers in the executive branch. His
speech also fails to differentiate among these various roles and responsibilities,
and thus may lead executive branch lawyers to, at times, misconstrue their ethi-
cal obligations. This Essay aims to fill that gap in Johnson's effort and highlight
the potential ill effects of making sweeping generalizations about the govern-
ment's interpretation of its authorities.
I. THE VARIED ROLES OF GOVERNMENT NATIONAL SECURITY LAWYERS
One of the first principles that a new lawyer learns is that he or she has an
ethical duty to be a strong and effective advocate for his or her client.5 This duty
is not without limitations, of course. A lawyer cannot advocate for a course of
thorities that will discredit our efforts, provoke controversy, and invite chal-
lenge.").
3. Id. at 144 ("I believe that over the last three years, the President has benefited from
healthy and robust debate among the lawyers on his national security team ....
[O]ur clients are sophisticated consumers of legal advice. The President, the Vice
President, the National Security Adviser, the Vice President's National Security
Adviser, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Ho-
meland Security are themselves all lawyers.").
4. Id. at 144 ("By contrast, 'group think' among lawyers is dangerous, because it
makes us lazy and complacent in our thinking and can lead to bad results. Like-
wise, shutting your eyes and ears to the legal dissent and concerns of others can
lead to disastrous consequences.... The report chronicles the failure of my pre-
decessor in the Bush Administration to listen to the objections of the Judge Advo-
cate General (JAG) leadership about enhanced interrogation techniques, the result
of which was that the legal opinion of one lieutenant colonel, without more, car-
ried the day as the legal endorsement for stress positions, the removal of clothing,
and the use of phobias to interrogate detainees at Guantinamo Bay.").
5. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. 5 2 (2012) ("As advocate, a lawyer zeal-
ously asserts the client's position under the rules of the adversary system."); see al-
so id. pmbl. 9 (discussing the "lawyer's obligation zealously to protect and pur-
sue a client's legitimate interests, within the bounds of the law"); D.C. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2007) ("A lawyer shall represent a client zealously and di-
ligently within the bounds of the law.").
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action that he or she knows to be indefensible as a matter of law.' Nor can a
lawyer violate his or her ethical duties as an officer of the court, including the
duty of candor to the tribunal' or his or her responsibility as a lawyer appearing
ex parte to fully disclose material facts, even where such facts may be adverse to
his or her client's position.
However, while young lawyers and law students often think of themselves
primarily as advocates for clients, it is important to note that lawyers often play
a much larger and more complicated role in our legal system. The American
Bar Association's (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct identify three
meta-responsibilities for a practicing lawyer: (i) serving as a representative of
clients; (2) serving as an officer of the legal system; and (3) serving as a public
citizen who has a special responsibility for the quality of justice.9
Within these meta-responsibilities, the ABA identifies four specific roles
that a lawyer plays when he or she is a representative of a client: (i) the advisor,
who provides clients with an informed understanding of their legal rights and
obligations, along with their practical implications; (2) the advocate, who zeal-
ously asserts the client's position in the adversarial system; (3) the negotiator,
who seeks an advantageous result for his or her client, consistent with the re-
quirements of honest dealings with others; and (4) the evaluator, who examines
a client's legal affairs and reports about them to the client or others, as appro-
priate.o
The majority of the ABA's Model Rules, under this grouping, provide ethi-
cal guidance to lawyers on how to regulate their conduct in their role as an ad-
vocate. As noted above, these rules require zealous advocacy on behalf of
clients, tempered by important limitations, including the requirements to only
make arguments that are consistent with the law (or involve good faith argu-
ments for an extension, modification, or change in the law) and to display ap-
propriate conduct before tribunals." However, with respect to the other roles
the Model Rules impose upon lawyers, the ABA provides fairly limited ethical
guidance. For example, on the ethical responsibilities of a lawyer as an advisor,
the rules simply state that a lawyer ought to render candid advice and exercise
independent, professional judgment in a way that considers the moral, econom-
ic, social, and political factors relevant to the client's situation." In the context
6. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2012).
7. Id. R. 3.3.
8. Id. R. 3.3(d).
9. Id. pmbl. 1 1.
10. Id. 2.
ni. See supra notes 6-10.
12. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2012); see also Catherine J. Lanctot,
The Duty of Zealous Advocacy and the Ethics of the Federal Government Lawyer:
The Three Hardest Questions, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 951, 985-86 (1991) (identifying a
lack of clarity in the rule for government lawyers acting in the advisor role in that
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of the lawyer as a public citizen, the Model Rules simply suggest that a lawyer
ought to seek improvement of the law, the quality of the legal profession, the
administration of justice, and access to the legal system, as well as to further the
public's understanding of and confidence in the rule of law and the justice sys-
tem.
Even in the context of advocacy, however, the rules applicable to a govern-
ment lawyer are far from clear. For example, there is much debate in the aca-
demic literature over exactly whom a government lawyer represents.14 Is it the
particular agency involved in the matter before the lawyer, the responsible of-
ficers of that agency, the branch of government employing the lawyer, the gov-
ernment generally, or the American people? 5 While this question remains
largely unsettled, what remains clear is that government lawyers, like lawyers in
the private sector, are often called upon to play a variety of roles and, as a result,
have varied ethical responsibilities.
"the duty to consider the public good is a duty of all public servants, not just law-
yers... [and] in the American political system, the responsibility to decide which
government policy will serve the public good ordinarily rests with elected officials,
not with government lawyers" (citation omitted)).
13. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl ! 6 (2012); see also Deborah L.
Rhode, Colloquium: What Does It Mean To Practice Law "in the Interests of Justice"
in the Twenty-First Century?, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1543, 1545-48 (2002) (discussing
differing conceptions of the role of a lawyer as a public citizen).
14. See, e.g., HAZARD ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 581 (5th ed. 2010)
("Who is the client of the government lawyer? Possible contenders include the
agency head, the chief executive officer (e.g., the governor or president), the legis-
lature as the elected representatives of the public, and the 'public."'); Roger C.
Cramton, The Lawyer as Whistleblower: Confidentiality and Government Lawyer, 5
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 291, 296 (1991) ("In this unusual world, who is the govern-
ment lawyer's client? The question has vexed decision-makers and commentators
for many years. The possibilities include: (1) the public (2) the government as a
whole (3) the branch of government in which the lawyer is employed (4) the par-
ticular agency or department in which the lawyer works and (5) the responsible
officers who make decisions for the agency."); Michelle M. Kwon, The Tax Man's
Ethics: Four of the Hardest Ethical Questions for an IRS Lawyer, 9 CARDOZO PUB. L.
POL'Y & ETHICS J. 371, 391 (2011) ("Defining a government lawyer's client some-
times proves difficult. Depending on the type of lawyer and the type of represen-
tation, the government lawyer's client may be a particular government official, a
member of the military, a branch of government, a particular agency, or even the
government as a whole."); Patricia E. Salkin & Allyson Phillips, Eliminating Politi-
cal Maneuvering: A Light in the Tunnel for the Government Attorney-Client Privi-
lege, 39 IND. L. REV. 561, 564 (20o6) ("The literature is full of robust debate...
with arguments advanced that the client can be an individual public official, an
agency or department within the government, the government as a whole, or the
public at large.").
15. See sources cited supra note 14.
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For example, a lawyer in the United States Department of Justice's National
Security Division (NSD) might serve as an advocate for the government, either
as a prosecutor in the Counterterrorism or Counterespionage Sections or as a
lawyer in the Office of Intelligence seeking ex parte orders for surveillance in
front of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC).16 These lawyers, in
their role as advocates, seek a substantive outcome on behalf of the federal gov-
ernment-either a conviction and sentence in the case of the prosecutors or, in
the case of lawyer in the Office of Intelligence, a surveillance order usually tar-
geting a foreign power, an agent of a foreign power, or foreigners located over-
seas.
Alternatively, an NSD lawyer in the Office of Law and Policy, either work-
ing alone or with the Department's Office of Legal Counsel, may serve as an ad-
visor to operators and lawyers in the Intelligence Community, providing guid-
ance to those individuals and agencies on their rights and obligations under the
law.17 Specifically, a national security lawyer playing such a role might provide
advice on what the law does and does not permit in the context of a proposed
action. That is, the lawyer may provide advice on exactly where the proverbial
"foul line" sits and what actions an intelligence community agency or operator
might permissibly take within those boundaries.
One variant on this role, albeit not one that is unique to government na-
tional security lawyers, is the lawyer as policy counselor. In this capacity, the
lawyer must not only provide guidance to an agency or operator on where the
foul line sits, but also advise his or her client on (i) how close to the foul line
they ought to play, and (2) the relative risks and benefits of playing that close to,
or far from, the foul line.
Another role of the national security lawyer is similar to that of the "evalua-
tor," in ABA terms, or the oversight lawyer, in federal government-speak. In
this capacity, for example, a lawyer in NSD's Office of Intelligence might con-
duct oversight over an agency collecting intelligence pursuant to a FISC autho-
rization. That lawyer may be called upon to ensure that all collection is con-
ducted within the bounds of the FISC's orders. In this role the lawyer serves as
an umpire, determining whether any lines were crossed, and, if so, whether any
discipline or procedures ought to be recommended to help ensure the problem
does not arise again.
It is critical to note, however, that while the ethical duties of lawyers clearly
change as they move between these roles, it is unusual for the lawyers and the
institutions they work for to discuss these varied ethical responsibilities and de-
termine which ought to apply in a given workday scenario. Nor do they organ-
ize themselves in ways that cleanly divide up these roles and responsibilities so
16. See National Security Division Progress Report, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE (Apr. 2008),
http://www.justice.gov/nsd/docs/2008/nsd-progress-rpt-2o8.pdf (describing the
operations of the NSD's Counterterrorism Section, Counterespionage Section,
and Office of Intelligence).
17. Id. at 27-29 (describing the operations of NSD's Office of Law and Policy).
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as to ensure that it is clear which ethical responsibilities apply in particular cir-
cumstance."
II. THE VARIED ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF GOVERNMENT NATIONAL
SECURITY LAWYERS
Ethical challenges arise most often when we ask national security lawyers to
play multiple roles but provide them no rubric to distinguish between those
roles and no ethical framework to apply. Take the example of the Office of In-
telligence lawyer. The NSD was created in 20o6, and there was a major reorgan-
ization of the then-named Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR) in
20o8, which cleanly separated out the oversight section from the operations sec-
tion and the litigation section.'9 Prior to these reforms, it was not unusual for
OIPR lawyers to be responsible one day for obtaining surveillance orders under
FISA, acting as advocates for the government's position before the FISC, and
the very next day to be required to act as oversight lawyers, looking deep into
the operations conducted by the very agencies whose surveillance orders they
had previously been in charge of obtaining. Even more challenging from an eth-
ical perspective is the fact that the results of the lawyer's oversight work are of-
ten required-by the FISC's orders, policies, practices, or procedures-to be
provided to the judicial branch.
One way to address such challenges-as the NSD front office did in 2008-
is to take structural action to correct them. The 2008 reforms in NSD, which, as
noted above, served to separate OIPR's previously combined functions into op-
erations, litigation, and oversight, and sought to arrange the office itself against
the functional lines described above in the ABA Model Rules. The operations
and litigation functions are both principally advocacy roles, in that they involve
the filing of briefs and materials with the courts in order to achieve a substan-
tive result on behalf of the government. On the other hand, the oversight func-
tion is fundamentally an evaluative role, where the government lawyer is, like
an umpire, assessing the government's compliance with the appropriate rules,
and ensuring that appropriate corrective actions remedy any mistakes. Even
though Office of Intelligence lawyers may, over time, rotate between the three
sections, the separation of these sections into these three categories makes it
simpler for an attorney to understand what role he or she is likely to be called
upon to play on a given day.
18. While this Essay focuses on the particular case of government national security
lawyers-where the pressures on ethical responsibilities are particularly high giv-
en the classified nature and sensitivity of the work-this challenge faces all gov-
ernment lawyers and may reflect broader cultural and institutional issues that
ought to be addressed.
19. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, National Security Division Launches New
Office of Intelligence (Apr. 30, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/opalpr/20o8/April
/o8_nsd_36o.html.
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At the same time, the reform did not completely address the challenges of
national security lawyering in the Office of Intelligence. For example, the litiga-
tion section, which is responsible for arguing for the use and protection of FISA
information in federal court, is also responsible for seeking authorization from
the Attorney General to use FISA information in a federal prosecution. This lat-
ter process, internal to the executive branch, requires NSD lawyers to serve not
primarily as advocates, but rather as policy counselors to the Attorney General
on how the use of such information in court might play out and whether he
ought to approve or disapprove the request. Dividing this role from the re-
mainder of the litigation section's advocacy responsibilities before the federal
courts could further improve the separation between functions in NSD.
Why does it matter that government national security lawyers, like one of
the NSD lawyers described above, understand what roles they are playing? Does
it really affect how they carry out their day-to-day duties? The answer to these
questions is fairly simple: because national security lawyers in the government
are called upon every day to fulfill multiple functions, sometimes with very se-
rious real-world consequences, it is critical that they understand their different
functions so they can apply the appropriate ethical perspective to guide their
actions. To understand the central role lawyers play in such efforts, one need
only look at President Obama's homeland security and counterterrorism advis-
er John Brennan's description of the lengthy and detailed analysis government
lawyers undertake on behalf of the Department of Defense in the context of cer-
tain offensive counterterrorism operations.2 0 If a government lawyer is con-
fused or uncertain about the role he or she is meant to play at a given time, the
advice that he or she provides could be dramatically different, with very real
implications for the targets and beneficiaries of government action.
Take, for example, the situation posited by General Mike Hayden, the for-
mer Director of Central Intelligence and Director of the National Security
Agency, who once noted that he believed his role, as the head of an intelligence
community's operational, collection, and analytical component, was to play as
close to the foul line as possible, while always remaining in fair territory." That
20. See John 0. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Sec. & Counterter-
rorism, The Ethics and Efficacy of the President's Counterterrorism Strategy (Apr.
30, 2012) (transcript available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-efficacy-
and-ethics-us-counterterrorism-strategy) (emphasizing the significant role "legal
review" plays in decisions regarding the use of offensive counterterrorism meas-
ures).
21. See Gen. Michael V. Hayden, CIA Director's Address at Duquesne University
Commencement (May 4, 2007), https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches
-testimony/2007/cia-directors-address-at-duquesne-university-commencement
.html ("At a confirmation hearing a couple of years ago, one of the senators asked
if I would respect American civil liberties in carrying out my intelligence tasks. I,
of course, said that I would. I also told him that I had a duty to play aggressively-
'right up to' the line. Playing back from the line protected me but didn't protect
America. I made it clear I would always play in fair territory, but that there would
be chalk dust on my cleats.").
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is, General Hayden liked to argue that he wasn't really doing his job well
enough if there wasn't "chalk dust on [his] cleats."" This, of course, might
present a challenge for a lawyer working for General Hayden.
For one of General Hayden's lawyers tasked with seeking a surveillance or-
der from the FISC there is little to no problem: he or she can (and usually ought
to) be a forceful advocate for the government, making every appropriate argu-
ment to get as much surveillance as possible and for as long a period as possi-
ble." In a sense, then, the lawyer as advocate is right there alongside General
Hayden, getting a little chalk on his or her cleats.
For the Hayden lawyer playing the advisor role, however, the ethical re-
sponsibility to be a forceful advocate is largely sidelined, while the ethical re-
sponsibility to paint a detailed picture of where the specific legal lines sit and to
explain how he and other operators might stay within those boundaries is max-
imized. In this role, the lawyer isn't getting any chalk on his or her cleats; rather,
he or she is just pointing out where the line is and how to play the game within
the lines.
And, of course, for the Hayden lawyer playing the policy counselor role, he
or she is required not only to provide advice on where the legal lines sit, but also
to exercise legal, political, and policy judgment to recommend options the gov-
ernment should consider and, ultimately, to advise on the option it ought to
adopt going forward. In this role, the lawyer might or might not get some chalk
on his or her cleats. The policy advisor is able to argue that the government
should play right up to the line, or that the government ought to play ten yards
back. Either position is wholly appropriate and consistent with the lawyer's eth-
22. Id.
23. In this context, of course, a government lawyer must also actively keep in mind
the importance of being fully forthcoming with a court, as government lawyers
typically appear before the FISC ex parte and in camera. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1805
(2012) (providing for issuance of an ex parte order under FISA); see also UNITED
STATES FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT RULES OF PROCEDURE R.
17(b) (2010) ("Except as the Court otherwise directs or the Rules otherwise pro-
vide, a hearing in a non-adversarial matter must be ex parte and conducted within
the Court's secure facility."). Similarly, the Supreme Court has made clear that
while a government lawyer has a duty to aggressively pursue the government's po-
sition and "strike hard blows," he or she may not go beyond the bounds of appro-
priate behavior by "strik[ing] foul blows," by employing improper methods or
seeking a result not warranted by the evidence or the law. See, e.g., Berger v. Unit-
ed States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) ("The United States Attorney is the representative
not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to
govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose in-
terest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that
justice shall be done.... He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed,
he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike
foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to
produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring
about a just one.").
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ical duties because his or her role is not to argue for the government in court,
and not simply to advise where the lines are, but to argue exactly how far from
the line the government ought to play.
Given the substantially different advice a lawyer might give depending on
the role he or she is to play, and the different ethical responsibilities accompa-
nying each of those roles, it is important to ensure that a federal lawyer knows
exactly what role he or she is playing before tackling a given scenario.
III. THE CHALLENGE OF NOT DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN NATIONAL SECURITY
LAWYER ROLES
This brings us to the fundamental problem with Jeh Johnson's speech: it
does not account for the range of perspectives that government lawyers must be
prepared to bring to their work. When Johnson argues, in the context of the
ongoing conflict with al Qaeda and its associated forces, that the government
"must guard against aggressive interpretations of [its] authorities that will dis-
credit [its] efforts, provoke controversy, and invite challenge," 4 he does not
specify the scope of his message and thereby creates the potential for govern-
ment national security lawyers to apply his approach beyond its intended con-
text. Johnson does not delineate the lines between the various roles a govern-
ment lawyer may play. He simply makes the statement that the government-
and presumably its lawyers-should not pursue aggressive interpretations of its
authorities.
Is Johnson arguing that a government lawyer ought never to argue for the
most aggressive interpretation of its authorities, even when he or she is arguing
before a federal court? If this is Johnson's position, it certainly seems inconsis-
tent with a lawyer's general ethical duty of zealous representation. Of course,
the executive branch-like any other client-is entitled to tell its lawyers to be
less aggressive than the law permits. But if that is the policy position that John-
son is laying out, it seems important that he make that abundantly clear since
that approach represents a significant policy decision, one that cuts against the
normal instinct of a lawyer as an advocate.
Alternatively, is Johnson arguing that the government should not step right
up to General Hayden's proverbial chalk line when making policy judgments
about what counterterrorism actions it might take? Or is Johnson arguing that
when a government national security lawyer is playing the advisor role-
describing where the lines are-that he or she ought to provide more conserva-
tive advice to the government on how to play the game so that it ensures that it
stays within the lines? While it appears that Johnson is likely arguing for one of
these two latter points, the lack of clarity is particularly problematic because,
absent further context, Johnson's statements might lead a national security law-
yer in the executive branch to avoid taking the strongest possible line on behalf
of the government, even in court.
24. Johnson, supra note 1, at 145.
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Applying the ethical analysis set forth above, Johnson's statement, on its
face, is a perfectly appropriate statement of policy and, as such, it is a perfectly
appropriate position for a lawyer wearing the policy counselor hat to recom-
mend when the government is considering its litigation posture or the nature
and scope of counterterrorism actions it might undertake." However, for the
lawyer wearing the advocacy hat, appearing before a federal court (whether ex
parte or in an adversarial setting), there is little excuse to present anything other
than the strongest arguments in support of the government's position."
Of course, any such arguments must be within the bounds of the laws and
Constitution of the United States. And, as noted previously, the executive
branch is always free to direct-as a matter of policy-its lawyers not to take
the most aggressive position possible. 7 However, absent such a policy decision,
for a federal national security lawyer not to take the most forward-leading posi-
tion possible before a court would essentially be to ignore his or her responsibil-
ity to be a vigorous and effective advocate for his or her client." As another cur-
25. See Lanctot, supra note 12, at 1014-15 ("Government officials must weigh the inter-
ests of competing groups, the litigation risks, the likelihood of success, and the
political ramifications of government action or inaction. Indeed, it is precisely this
task that they were elected to perform .... As government officials and as lawyers
representing clients, government lawyers should participate in this decision-
making process.").
26. See, e.g., D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3(b) (2007) ("A lawyer shall not in-
tentionally ... [flail to seek the lawful objectives of a client through reasonably
available means permitted by law and the disciplinary rules."); see also id. R. 1.3
cmt. i ("The duty of a lawyer, both to the client and to the legal system, is to
represent the client zealously within the bounds of the law .... This duty requires
the lawyer to ... take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindi-
cate a client's cause or endeavor."); Lanctot, supra note 12, at 1013 ("The intrinsi-
cally different nature of the government client cannot alone justify a departure
from the traditional duty of zealous advocacy. Indeed, the opposite may well be
true. First, the government is entitled to have its views heard in federal court just
like any other litigant .... Not only are government agencies entitled to have their
positions presented in federal court, but if government lawyers interpose their
own views of what positions are worthy of defense, those agencies have nowhere
else to go.").
27. See Lanctot, supra note 12, at 1015 ("[Tihe decision as to which governmental ac-
tion will benefit 'the people' or 'the public interest' is vested in elected officials or
those to whom they have delegated their decision-making authority. Once that
policy decision has been made, the government lawyer may ethically defend it,
even if the lawyer believes that the public interest will not be served by that deci-
sion. The government lawyer, after all, is not employed by the federal government
to represent personal interests, and it is virtually impossible for anyone to deter-
mine where a neutral view of the 'public interest' ends and one's own personal
opinions begin.").
28. See id. at 1013-14 ("The government lawyers may, and clearly should, advise the
agencies of their conclusions on the merits, as should private lawyers. Ultimately,
however, government lawyers must abide by their agency clients' decisions con-
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rent Administration political appointee, Matthew Olsen, the former General
Counsel to the National Security Agency and current head of the National
Counterterrorism Center, once said in a Law Day speech at the National Securi-
ty Agency:
[W]e have to be advocates. Once a decision is made to pursue an ac-
tion or policy, our role as national security lawyers shifts from provid-
ing advice to being advocates. Our duty then is to argue for the gov-
ernment's position-forcefully within the bounds of our ethical
obligations. Our job, in other words, is to persuade and win. 9
Unlike Olsen, who clearly argues that the role of a government lawyer, acting as
an advocate, is to forcefully push the government's position, Johnson's lack of
precision could very well lead a government lawyer to avoid pursuing the gov-
ernment's strongest arguments in court.
Johnson should clarify whether his statement applies to all interpretations
of the law applicable to the conflict with al Qaeda, including those interpreta-
tions put forth by government national security lawyers advocating on behalf of
the government in court, or whether it is limited to the policy counseling con-
text, where lawyers can and ought to express their views on the appropriate
posture for the government's actions. Absent such clarification, government
lawyers may interpret Johnson's statement more broadly than he intended,
which might lead to a weakening of the government's national security posture
in the federal courts. If a lawyer fails to make the strongest argument for his or
her client's position in court, the client is less likely to succeed; the same is true
when a government national security lawyer appears before a federal court. The
problem in the latter case, of course, is that if the government lawyer fails to ob-
tain a surveillance order or lock up a terrorist, there can be potentially cata-
strophic consequences. Johnson and those who share his view owe our national
security lawyers further guidance on whether and how aggressively they ought
to represent the government in federal court on national security matters.
cerning the objectives of representation. More important, suggesting that gov-
ernment lawyers are to scrutinize government policies or litigation strategies to
determine whether they are 'fair' or 'just' may well be inconsistent with the politi-
cal system in which those lawyers participate. At best, it imposes a policy judg-
ment about the independence of government lawyers in the guise of an ethical
prescription. Federal government lawyers are not elected, and they do not
represent any constituency. For better or worse, the American political system
places the burden of determining the 'fairness' or 'justice' of public policy upon
elected officials in the first instance and, ultimately, upon the courts.").
29. Matthew G. Olsen, Gen. Counsel, Nat'l Sec. Agency, Remarks at National Security
Agency Law Day (Oct. 14, 2010) (on file with author).
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